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Abstract— We present five methods to the problem of net-
work anomaly detection. These methods cover most of the
common techniques in the anomaly detection field, including
Statistical Hypothesis Tests (SHT), Support Vector Machines
(SVM) and clustering analysis. We evaluate all methods in a
simulated network that consists of nominal data, three flow-
level anomalies and one packet-level attack. Through analyzing
the results, we point out the advantages and disadvantages
of each method and conclude that combining the results of
the individual methods can yield improved anomaly detection
results.
I. INTRODUCTION
A network anomaly is any potentially malicious traffic that
has implications for the security of the network. It is of par-
ticular importance to the prevention of zero-day attacks, i.e.,
attacks not previously seen, and malicious data exfiltration.
These are key areas of concern for both government and
corporate entities.
From the perspective of methodology, network anomaly
detection methods can be classified as stochastic and de-
terministic. Stochastic methods fit reference data to a prob-
abilistic model and evaluate the fitness of the new traffic
with respect to this model [7], [11], [12], [22], [29]. The
evaluation can be done using Statistical Hypothesis Testing
(SHT) [5], [13], [16], [19]. Deterministic methods, on the
other hand, try to partition the feature space into “normal”
and “abnormal” regions through a deterministic decision
boundary. The boundary can be determined using methods
like Support Vector Machine (SVM), particularly 1-class
SVM [9], [21], [25], and clustering analysis [1], [6].
From the perspective of data, network anomaly methods
can be either packet-based [7], [17], flow-based [2], [18] or
window-based [12]. Packet-based methods evaluate the raw
packets directly while both flow-based and window-based
methods aggregate the packets first. Flow-based methods
evalulate each flow individually, which is defined as a collec-
tion of packets with similar properties. Flows are considered
as a good tradeoff between cost of collection and level
of detail [26]. Window-based methods group consecutive
packets or flows based on a sliding window.
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Fig. 1. Relationships among the five evaluated methods.
The main goal of this paper is to discuss the advantages
and distadvantages of each category of methods for different
applications. This paper presents five methods, covering most
of the categories discussed above, to the problem of host-
based network anomaly detection and provides a comparative
analysis. The first four methods are revisions of authors’
previous work with collaborators and the last method is new.
The first two methods are based on SHT, utilizing results
from Large Deviations Theory (LDT) [4] to compare cur-
rent network traffic to probability laws governing nominal
network traffic. The two methods fit traffic, which is a
sequence of flows, with probabilistic models under i.i.d. and
Markovian assumptions, respectively. We refer to these two
methods as model-free and model-based methods.
The next two methods are based on an 1-class SVM. In
the first of the two methods, individual data transmissions
from a given source are examined independently from neigh-
boring transmissions, producing a flow-by-flow detector. In
the other, sequences of flows within a time window are
considered together to construct a window-based detector.
These two methods will be called flow 1-class SVM and
window 1-class SVM method, respectively.
Finally, we also present a clustering method based on
Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) [3], which is a machine
learning technique originating in the biology field. This
algorithm, named ART clustering [23], partitions network
traffic into clusters based on the unique features of the
network flows.
The relationships among these methods are depicted in
Figure 1. The flow 1-class SVM and the ART clustering
method are flow-based and capable of identifying individual
network flows that are anomalous. By contrast, the remain-
ing methods are window-based, under which the flows are
grouped into a window based on their start time and only
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suspicious windows of time can be identified as anomalous.
Model-free and model-based methods are stochastic and the
rest methods are deterministic.
A challenging problem in the evaluation of anomaly de-
tection methods is the lack of test data with ground truth, due
to the limited availability of such data. The most widely used
labeled dataset, DAPRA intrusion detection dataset [14], was
collected 14 years ago. Since then, the network condition
has changed significantly. In order to address this problem,
we developed software to generate labeled data, including
a flow-level anomaly data generator (SADIT [28]) and a
packet-level botnet attack data generator (IMALSE [27]). We
evaluate all of our methodologies on a simulated network and
compare their performance under three flow-level anomalies
and one Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the representation of network traffic data. Sec-
tion III provides a mathematical description of the methods
used to identify anomalies. Section IV provides an in-depth
explanation of the simulated network and the anomalies.
Section V presents the results of the five methods on the
simulated network data. Finally, Section VI provides con-
cluding remarks.
II. NETWORK TRAFFIC REPRESENTATION
Let S = {s1, . . . , s|S|} denote the collection of all packets
on the server which is monitored, where each element of S
is one packet. We focus on host-based anomaly detection, in
which case we only care about the user IP address, namely
the destination IP addresses for the outgoing packets and
the source IP addresses for the incoming packets. Denote
the user IP address in a packet si as xi, whose format will
be discussed later. The size of si is bi ∈ [0,∞) in bytes
and the start time of transmission is ti ∈ [0,∞) in seconds.
Using this convention, the packet si can be represented as
(xi, bi, ti) for all i = 1, . . . , |S|.
Due to the vast number of packets, we consolidate this
representation of network traffic by grouping series of pack-
ets into flows. We compile a sequence of packets s1 =
(x1, b1, t1), . . . , sn = (xn, bn, tn) with t1 < · · · < tn
into a flow f = (x, b, dt, t) if x = x1 = · · · = xn and
ti − ti−1 < δF for i = 2, . . . , n and some prescribed
δF ∈ (0,∞). Here, the size b is simply the sum of the sizes
of the packets that comprise the flow. The value dt = tn−t1
denotes the flow duration. The value t = t1 denotes the
start time of the first packet of the flow. In this way, we
can translate the large collection of traffic packets S into a
relatively small collection of flows F = {f1, . . . , f |F|}.
In some applications in which large numbers of users
frequently access the server under surveillance, it may be
infeasible to characterize network behavior for each user.
Different methods deal with this dilemma differently.
For both statistical and SVM methods, we first dis-
till the “user space” into something more manageable
while enabling us to characterize network behavior of
user groups instead of just individual users. For sim-
plicity of notation, we only consider IPv4 addresses. If
xi = (xi1, x
i
2, x
i
3, x
i
4) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 255}4 and xj =
(xj1, x
j
2, x
j
3, x
j
4) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 255}4 are two IPv4 addresses,
the distance between them is defined as: d(xi,xj) =∑
k=1,...,4 256
4−k|xik − xjk|. This metric can be easily ex-
tended to IPv6 addresses if needed. Suppose X is the set
of unique IP addresses in F . We apply typical K-means
clustering on X [8], [15]. For each x ∈ X , we thus obtain
a cluster label k(x). Suppose the cluster center for cluster
k is x¯k, then the distance of x to the corresponding cluster
center is da(x) = d(x, x¯k(x)). Using user clusters, we can
produce our final representation of a flow as:
f = (k(x), da(x), b, dt, t). (1)
For the ART clustering method, distilling the user space
beforehand is not required. However, instead of using the IP
address directly, we use a compact representation. Let nf (x)
be the number of flows transmitted between the user with IP
address x and the server. Define db(x) = d(x,x∗),∀x ∈ X ,
where x∗ is the IP address of the server we are monitoring;
then the alternative flow representation we use is:
f = (nf (x), db(x), b, dt, t). (2)
III. ANOMALY DETECTION METHODS
A. Statistical Methods
Let h be the interval between the start points of
two consecutive time windows and ws be an appro-
priate window size; then the total number of windows
is nw =
⌈
(t|F| − t1 − ws)/h
⌉
. We say flow f i =
(k(xi), da(x
i), bi, dit, t
i) belongs to window j if t1 + (j −
1)h ≤ ti < t1 + (j − 1)h+ ws, ∀j = 1, . . . , nw.
Let gi = (k(xi), da(xi), bi, dit) be the flow attributes in f
i
without the start time ti and Gj = {g1,g2, . . . ,g|Gj |} be the
flows in window j. Let Gref be the set of all flows used as
reference. The window-based methods will compare Gj with
Gref for all j = 1, . . . nw. Both statistical methods we will
present in this section fall into this category and can work
in supervised as well as unsupervised modes. In supervised
mode, Gj is generated by removing suspicious flows from
a small fragment of data through human inspection. In
unsupervised mode, we assume that the anomales are short-
lived thus Gj can be chosen as a large set of nework traffic.
Since the approach introduced in what follows applies
to all windows as well as to nominal flows, we use
G = {g1, . . . ,g|G|} to refer to Gref and Gj ,∀j = 1, . . . nw.
Suppose the range of da(xi),∀i = 1, . . . , |G| is
[dmina , d
max
a ]. We can then define a discrete alphabet Σda ={
dmina + (m+ 1/2)× (dmaxa − dmina )/|Σda |
}
m=0,...,|Σda |−1
for da(xi), where |Σda | is called quantization level. Σb
and Σdt can be defined similarly for b
i and dit. We
then quantize da(xi), bi and dit in g
i to the closest
symbol in the discrete alphabet set Σda and Σb and Σdt ,
respectively. Suppose the total number of user clusters
is K. Then we can denote the quantized flow sequence
G = {g1, . . . ,g|G|} as Σ(G) = {σ(g1), . . . ,σ(g|G|)},
where Σ = {0, . . . ,K − 1} × Σda × Σb × Σdt is the
discrete alphabet for quantization where each symbol in Σ
corresponds to a flow state.
1) Model-free Method: In cases in which all flows em-
anating from the server under surveillance are i.i.d., we
construct the empirical measure of flow sequence G =
{g1, . . . ,g|G|} as the frequency distribution vector
EG(ρ) = 1|G|
|G|∑
i=1
1{σ(gi) = ρ}, (3)
where 1{·} denotes the indicator function and σ(gi) denotes
the flow state in Σ that gi gets mapped to. We will denote
the probability vector derived from the empirical measure of
the form in (3) as EG = {EG(σ1), . . . , EG(σ|Σ|)}.
Let µ denote the probability vector calculated from the
reference flows Gref . That is, µ(σ) is the reference marginal
probability of flow state σ. Using Sanov’s theorem [16],
[4], we construct a metric to compare empirical measures
of the form in (3) to µ, thus a metric of the “normality”
of a sequence of flows. For every probability vector ν
with support Σ, let H(ν|µ) = ∑σ∈Σ ν(σ) log (ν(σ)/µ(σ))
be the relative entropy of ν with respect to µ. Allowing
η = − 1n log , where  is a tolerable false alarm rate, then
the model-free anomaly detector is:
I(G) = 1{I1(EG) ≥ η}, (4)
where I1(EG) = H(EG |µ). It was shown in [19] that (4) is
asymptotically Neyman-Pearson optimal.
2) Model-based Method: As an alternative to the i.i.d.
assumption on the sequence of flows under the model-free
method, we now turn to the case in which the sequence of
flows adheres to a first-order Markov chain. The notion of
empirical measure on the sequence G = {g1, . . . ,g|G|} must
now be adapted to consider subsequent pairs of flow states.
We assume no knowledge of an initial flow state σ(g1) and
define the empirical measure on G, under the Markovian
assumption, as the frequency distribution on the possible flow
state transitions,
EGB(σi,σj) =
1
|G|
|G|∑
l=2
1
{
σ(gl−1) = σi,σ(gl) = σj
}
,
(5)
where 1{·} denotes the indicator function and σ(gl) denotes
the flow state in Σ which gl gets mapped to. We will denote
probability matrices formed by the empirical measure in (5)
as EGB =
{EGB(σi,σj)}i,j=1,...,|Σ|.
In the following, we will refer to matrices of the form
Q = {q(σi,σj)}i,j=1,...,|Σ| as probability matrices with
support Σ × Σ. By design, the empirical measures of the
form (5) are probability matrices with support Σ × Σ.
Each probability matrix, under the Markovian assumption,
is associated with a transition probability matrix of the form
{q(σj |σi)}i,j=1,...,|Σ| where q(σj |σi) = q(σi,σj)/q(σi).
Here q(σi) =
∑|Σ|
j=1 q(σ
i,σj) denotes the marginal proba-
bility of flow state σi in Q.
Let Π = {pi(σi,σj)}i,j=1,...,|Σ| denote, under the Marko-
vian assumption, the true probability matrix of sequences of
flows. As in the i.i.d. case, we compute Π via (5) from
Gref . Following a similar procedure as in the i.i.d. case, we
use an analog of the Sanov’s Theorem for the Markovian
case, which appears in [4], as the basis for our model-
based stochastic anomaly detector. For every shift invariant
probability matrix Q with support Σ× Σ, let
HB(Q|Π) =
|Σ|∑
i,j=1
q(σi,σj) log
q(σj |σi)
pi(σj |σi) .
be the relative entropy of Q with respect to Π. Then in the
model-based method, the indicator of anomaly for G is:
IB(G) = 1{I2(EGB) ≥ η} (6)
where I2(EGB) = HB(EGB |Π) and η = 1n log  with  be an
allowable false alarm rate. Again, the model-based detector
has been proved in [19] to be asymptotically Neyman-
Pearson optimal.
B. 1-class SVM
We turn now to deterministic methods based on the
construction of a decision boundary. We focus on one pop-
ular technique named 1-class SVM [16], [24]. The premise
behind 1-class SVM is to find a hyperplane that separates the
majority of the data Z = {z1, . . . , z|Z|} from the outliers by
solving a Quadratic Programming (QP) Problem [19], [24].
The hyperplane can be generalized to a nonlinear boundary
by mapping the inputs into high-dimensional spaces with a
kernel function K(·, ·) [9]. There is a tunable parameter ν
effectively tuning the number of outliers.
1) Flow 1-class SVM: We consider a set of flows G =
{g1, . . . ,g|G|} that need to be evaluated. According to (1),
each flow has the format of g = (k(x), da(x), b, dt), which
has already provided a rather compact representation of
network traffic. The only additional process required is to
remove the label of the cluster each user belongs to. The
new data are: Z = {z1 = (da(x1), b1, d1t ), . . . , z|Z| =
(da(x
|Z|), b|Z|, d|Z|t ). The reasoning for this is that, since
we are measuring departures from nominal users, the actual
cluster a user belongs to is less important than the distance
between the user the cluster center. Besides, as a categorical
attribute, cluster labels make 1-class SVM method more
unstable in practice. Besides, we choose the radial basis
function K(u,v) = exp
(−γ(u− v)T (u− v)) as the ker-
nel function [16].
2) Window 1-class SVM: We combine the techniques
described in Section III-A and the 1-class SVM into a
window-based 1-class SVM method. For each window j
with flows Gj , we can get the model-free empirical measure
EGj and the model-based empirical measure EGjB . Let the
feature vector for window j be Y j =
{
EGj ,EGjB , |Gj |
}
.
Let Y = {Y 1, . . . , Y |Y|} be a time series consisting of the
features for all windows, then an 1-class SVM can be used
to evaluate Y , resulting in a window-based anomaly detector.
Note that since the dimension of feature Y j is usually very
large, it often helps to apply Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) [20] to reduce the dimensionality first.
C. ART Clustering
In this section, we present a clustering algorithm based on
ART theory [3] and apply it to network anomaly detection.
The algorithm first organizes inputs into clusters based on
a customized distance metric. Then, a dynamic learning
approach is used to update clusters or to create new clusters.
Assume a set of flows F = {f1, . . . , f |F|} with form
in (2). Similar to the statistical methods, we define gi =
(nf (x), db(x), b
i, dit) to be the attributes in f
i without the
start time ti and G is the counterpart of F . Suppose gij
is the jth attribute of flow gi for all i = 1, . . . , |G| and
j = 1, 2, 3, 4. Defining fmin(j,G) and fmax(j,G) to be the
minimum and maximum of the set {gij : ∀i = 1, . . . , |G|},
we can normalize G according to gˆij = gij−fmin(j,G))fmax(j,G)−fmin(j,G)
for all i = 1, . . . , |G|, and j = 1, 2, 3, 4. In this section we
assume that the data in G has already been normalized.
Define the distance metric
D(p,q) =
m∑
j=1
(
pj − qj
1− vj
)2
(7)
for two m-dimensional vectors p = (p1, . . . , pm) and q =
(q1, . . . , qm), where v = (v1, . . . , vm) is a set of parameters
vj ∈ [0, 1) that controls the vigilance in dimension j.
Let Tk be the set of all flows in cluster k. Letting ck =
(nkf , d
k, bk, dkt ) represent the center of cluster k and c
j
k be
its j component. Let C be the set of all cluster centers. For
every c ∈ C and a prescribed r,
D(g, c) ≤ r,g ∈ Rm (8)
defines an ellipsoid in Rm. A higher vigilance in one dimen-
sion means the ellipsoid is more shallow in this direction.
The ART clustering algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
Initially C is empty. For each flow gi ∈ G, we calculate the
set D which consists of all clusters whose ellipsoid defined
by (8) contains gi. Suppose E(g, c) is the Euclidean distance
between g and c. If D is not empty, gi is assigned to the
cluster whose center has the smallest Euclidean distance
with gi and the corresponding cluster center is updated;
otherwise a new cluster is created. Suppose that flow gi will
be assigned to cluster k, let cj
′
k and c
j
k be the jth component
of the center of cluster k before and after the assignment,
then
cj
′
k = (p× cjk + gij)/(p+ 1),∀j = 1, . . . ,m, (9)
where p is the number of flows in cluster k before the
assignment. Because of the adaptive update (9), some as-
signments may become unreasonable after update as some
flows may become closer to other cluster centers. As a result,
the algorithm processes flows in G again until an equilibrium
is reached.
Once a stable equilibrium is reached, small outlying clus-
ters are identified as anomalous based on the rule
IA(Tk) = 1{|Tk| < τ × |G|/|C|} (10)
where IA(Tk) is an indicator of anomaly for Tk, τ ∈ [0, 1]
is a prescribed detection threshold, |C| and |G| are the total
Algorithm 1 ART clustering Algorithm
Require: Flow Data G = {g1, . . . ,g|G|}
C = Clast = {}
while C 6= Clast do
Clast = C
for i = 1→ |G| do
D = {c ∈ C : D(gi, c)) < r}
if |D| = 0 then
C = {C,gi}
else
co = arg minc∈C E(gi, c)
Tk = {Tk,gi}, k is the index of co in C.
Recalculate cluster center of Tk using (9)
end if
end for
end while
central node
Fig. 2. Simulation setting.
number of clusters and flows, respectively. τ determines how
small a cluster must be to be considered as anomalous,
thus it influences the number of alarms. We will discuss the
relationship of τ and the false alarm rate further in Section V.
IV. NETWORK SIMULATION
The lack of annotated data is a common problem in
the network anomaly detection community. As a result, we
developed two open source software packages to provide
flow-level and packet-level validation datasets, respectively.
SADIT [28] is a software package containing all the algo-
rithms we described above. It also provides an annotated
flow record generator powered by the fs [26] simulator.
IMALSE [27] uses the NS3 simulator [10] for the network
simulation and generates packet-level annotated data. Simu-
lation at the packet-level takes more computation resources
but can mimic certain attacks, like botnet-based attacks, in
a more realistic way. We validate our algorithms with the
help of these two software packages. The packets generated
by IMALSE, which is of pcap format [27], are transformed
into flow records first. Then the flows generated by SADIT
and IMASLE are tested independently with each algorithm.
The simulated network is partitioned into an internal
network with a hub and spoke topology that connects to the
Internet via a gateway (Fig. 2). The internal network consists
of 8 normal users (CT1-CT8) and 1 server (SRV) with some
sensitive information. We monitor the traffic on the server.
A. Flow-level Anomalies
First, we generate a dataset with flow-level anomalies.
The size and the transmission of the nominal flows for user
i is assumed to follow a Gaussian distribution N(mi, σ2i )
and Poisson process with arrival rate λi, respectively. We
investigate three most common types of flow-level anomalies.
The first one mimics the scenario according to which a
network intruder or unauthorized user downloads restricted
data. A previously unseen user who has a large IP distance to
the rest of the users starts transmission for a short period. The
second one is a user i with suspicious flow size distribution
characterized by a mean mai higher than a typical value mi.
Usually flows with substantially large flow size are associated
with the situation when some users try to download large files
from the server, which can happen when the attacker tries
to download the sensitive information packed into a large
file. The last one is a user increasing its flow transmission
rate to an unusual value λai , which could be indicative of
the user finding an important directory on the server and
downloading, repeatedly, sensitive files within that directory.
B. Packet-level Anomalies
A second anomalous dataset is created using the tool
IMALSE [27]. The nominal traffic is generated using the
on-off application in NS3 [10], [27] in which the user sends
packets for ton seconds and the interval between two consec-
utive transmission is toff . The traffic is a Poisson process,
which means the on time and off times are exponentially
distributed with parameter λon and λoff , respectively.
We assume there is a botnet in the network. There is
a botmaster controlling the bot network and a Command
and Control (C&C) server issuing control commands to the
bots. In our simulation, both the botmaster and C&C server
are the machine INT2 in the Internet, and CT1-CT5 in the
internal network have been infected as bots. We investigate
a DDoS Ping flood attack in which each bot sends a lot
of ping packets to the server SRV upon the request of the
C&C server, aiming to exhaust the bandwidth of SRV. The
attack is simulated at the packet-level and the data are then
transformed into flow records using techniques described
in Section II. With appropriate δF , the ton becomes the
flow duration of nominal flows and the toff determines the
flow transmission rate of nominal flows. The initiating stage
of the attack is similar to the first case in the previous
section. During the attack, both the flow transmission rate
and the flow size of the bots may be affected. First, the flow
transmission rate is increased as the bots ping SRV more
frequently. Second, the ping packets have different sizes from
normal network traffic. Also, consecutive ping packets may
be combined together if they are sent over a short time
interval. The resulting flows may be very large in size if
these combinations are common or very small otherwise,
depending on the attack pattern.
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Fig. 3. The results of five methods in the atypical user case.
V. RESULTS
A. Flow-level Anomalies
1) Atypical User: Figure 3 shows the response of all
methods described above when there is an atypical user
trying to access the server between 1000s and 1300s. For
window-based methods, the interval between the starting
point of two consecutive time windows is h = 30s and the
window size is chosen as ws = 200s, so there is overlap
between two consecutive time windows. We also distill the
user space by using K-Means clustering with 3 clusters. The
quantization levels for flow size, distance to cluster and flow
duration are 3, 2, 1, respectively, thus |Σ| = 18. The x-axis
in all graphs corresponds to time (s) and the total simulation
time is 5000s. The first two graphs depict the entropy metric
in (4) and (6) of the model-free and model-based methods,
respectively. For both graphs, the green dashed line is the
threshold when the false alarm rate is  = 0.01. The interval
during which the entropy curve is above the threshold line
(the red part) is the interval the method reports as abnormal.
The x coordinates of the red points with a ‘+’ marker
correspond to the start point of the flow or the window the
method reports as abnormal. The parameter ν for the flow
1-class SVM and window 1-class SVM is 0.002 and 0.1,
respectively. The threshold τ for ART clustering is 0.05.
We can observe from Figure 3 that stochastic methods,
including our model-free and model-based methods, tend to
produce more stable results in the sense that they generate
fewer false alarms. At the same time, the flow 1-class SVM
and ART clustering methods, both of which are flow-based,
can provide higher identification resolution in the sense that
they can identify the suspicious flows, which is beyond the
capabilities of the stochastic methods. In the window 1-class
SVM method, we can tune the window size to adjust the
tradeoff of resolution and stability. However, the window
size in the model-free and model-based methods has to be
reasonably large since the optimality of the decision rule (4)
and (6) relies on the assumption of a large flow number in
each window.
This observation indicates that these methods are com-
plementary to each other. One way to combine them is
to use stochastic methods and window-based deterministic
methods to get a rough interval of an anomaly. Then, only
the flows that are both identified as suspicious by flow-based
deterministic methods and belong to the interval need to
be further evaluated. The first subfigure in Figure 4 shows
the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve of the
ART clustering method, which is a flow-based method, and
the combination of the ART clustering and the model-free
method. The ROC curve has been substantially improved
after combining the two methods. The second subfigure in
Figure 4 shows the relationship between the threshold τ
defined in (10) and the false alarm rate. The x-axis is the
false alarm rate and y-axis corresponds to the threshold. As
we can see, the false alarm rate increases when the threshold
increases and they are almost linearly related to each other.
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Fig. 4. ROC curve and relationship of τ and the false alarm rate for ART.
2) Large File Download: Figure 5 is the output of all
methods in the case where a user doubles its mean flow size
between 1000s and 1300s. Again, the first two graphs show
the entropy curve and threshold line of the model-free and
model-based methods. The total simulation time is 5000s.
The common window parameters h and ws are the same as
in the previous case. The false alarm rate is  = 0.01 for
both model-free and model-based methods. The parameter ν
for flow 1-class SVM and window 1-class SVM is 0.0015 and
0.1, respectively. τ = 0.01 for ART clustering.
3) Large Access Rate: Figure 6 shows the response of
model-free, model-based, window 1-class SVM and ART
clustering methods when a user suspiciously increases its
access rate to 6 times of its normal value during 1000s and
1300s. The total simulation time is 2000s. The parameters
for the algorithms are the same in the atypical user case.
Note that flow 1-class SVM cannot work for this type
of anomaly since it is purely temporal-based. The flow
itself does not change but its frequency does. There is no
way to identify the frequency change by just observing the
individual flows with representation in (1). ART clustering
works fairly well for this case because the attacker will have
larger nf (x) as it transmits more flows. Interestingly, the
model-based and model-free methods can work very well
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Fig. 5. The results of five methods in the large file download case.
since the portion of traffic originating from the attacker
changes, influencing the empirical measure defined in (3)
and (5). The two methods will not be effective in the very
rare case when all users increase their rate by the same ratio
synchronously.
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Fig. 6. The results of five methods in the large access rate case.
B. DDoS Attack
Figure 7 shows the response of model-free, model-based,
window 1-class SVM and flow 1-class SVM methods when
there is a DDoS attack targeting SRV between 500s and
600s. The total simulation time is 900s. For window-based
methods, the interval between consecutive time windows is
h = 10s and the window size is ws = 100s. The false alarm
rate for the model-free and model-based method is  = 0.01
and ν = 0.05 for window SVM.
Since the nominal traffic in IMALSE is generated based on
an i.i.d assumption, it is hard for the model-based method
to capture a Markov model. Yet, the model-based method
still detects the start and the end of the attack, during which
the transitional behavior changes the most. Model-free and
window 1-class SVM are more stable while the flow 1-class
SVM method provides higher resolution.
The ART clustering method is also not suited to detect
these type of attacks because the unsupervised learning
model is based on the assumption that malicious network
traffic represents a small percentage of total network traffic.
A DDoS attack generates a large number of packets and
without some prior knowledge of good or bad network traffic,
the ART clustering algorithm cannot distinguish between the
nominal and abnormal flows. It is also the reason for the
relatively unsatisfactory performance of the flow 1-class SVM
method. However, window 1-class SVM is not affected by
this because despite the large number of abnormal flows, the
number of abnormal windows is still very small.
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Fig. 7. The results for DDoS attack.
VI. CONCLUSION
We presented five complementary approaches, based on
SHT, SVM and clustering, that cover the common techniques
for host-based network anomaly detection. We developed
two open source software packages to provide flow-level
and packet-level validation datasets, respectively. With the
help of these software packages, we evaluated all methods
on a simulated network mimicking typical networks in
organizations. We consider three flow-level anomalies and
one packet-level DDoS attack.
Through analyzing the results, we summarize the advan-
tages and disadvantages of each method. In general, deter-
ministic and flow-based methods, such as flow 1-class SVM
and ART clustering, are more likely to have unstable results
with higher false alarm rates but they can identify abnormal
flows, namely they have better resolution. Stochastic and
window-based methods, such as our model-free and model-
based methods, could yield more stable results and detect
temporal anomalies better, but they have relatively poor res-
olution as they are not able to explicitly detect the anomalous
network flows. In addition, deterministic and window-based
methods, like window 1-class SVM offer parameters to adjust
the tradeoff of resolution and stability. This observation
suggests that combining the results of all, instead of just
using one method, can yield better overall performance.
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